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ABSTRACT
With the advent of cloud hosting and micro services architecture, services are becoming more
distributed and span across clouds, data centres, WANs/DMZs, etc., hence providing secure
connectivity and policy enforcement across a wide variety of these domains is a challenge,
especially when such services are dynamically instantiated and running remotely. In such
deployments, protecting sensitive information is very crucial especially with the enterprise cloud
deployments. Hence, we need a secure method to provide co-ordination among cloud applications
and services to share the services/resources across the registered cloud entities in service chaining
deployments. There are techniques which propose secure mechanism (e.g., IPSec/DTLS/GRE
tunnels) to communicate between enterprise edge to the cloud instances and from one cloud entity
to another but does not provide policy-based access as well as does not provide confidentiality
(encrypted traffic) at the service level. The techniques presented herein propose method to provide
secure end to end network deployment along with policy-based access control in service chaining
deployments without compromising on security, which would also help in multi cloud,
comprehensive, end-to-end network automation. The proposed method secures the end-to-end
services in multi-cloud Service Chaining deployments using service-based encryption along with
policy-based access to provide privacy using Hyperledger.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION
There is an increasing trend that enterprises outsource their network functions to the cloud
for lower cost and ease of management. However, network function outsourcing brings threats to
the security and privacy of enterprise since the cloud can access the traffic and policies/rules of incloud and multi-cloud network functions. One such aspect would be service chaining (aka sharing
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the resources) as part of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), which is materialised in cloud service
chaining deployments by extending to
•

Share Virtual Network Function (VNF) devices across service chains. Sharing VNF helps
to improve resource utilisation and reduce resource fragmentation.

•

Share Physical Network Function (PNF) devices across service chains, service groups and
cluster. Sharing PNF helps to overcome the performance and scaling issues.

With the advent of cloud hosting and micro services architecture, services are becoming
more distributed and span across clouds, data centres, WANs/DMZs, etc., hence providing secure
connectivity and policy enforcement across a wide variety of these domains is a challenge,
especially when such services are dynamically instantiated and running remotely. In such
deployments, protecting sensitive information is very crucial especially with the enterprise cloud
deployments.
Hence, we need a secure method to provide co-ordination among cloud applications and
services to share the services/resources across the registered cloud entities in service chaining
deployments. There are techniques which propose secure mechanism (e.g., IPSec/DTLS/GRE
tunnels) to communicate between enterprise edge to the cloud instances and from one cloud entity
to another but does not provide policy-based access as well as does not provide confidentiality
(encrypted traffic) at the service level. None of the existing techniques provides monolithic
service-based security mechanism (i.e., can be used at instance or service level) crucial for the
cloud service chaining deployments. Hence, we need confidentiality at the service level i.e., each
service should be encrypted with unique secret key and only the instances/nodes registered for the
service would be able to participate and decrypt the service information. This is especially
important in enterprise cloud deployments where customers need not know the service offered to
other customers viz., services would be offered with different licensing etc.,
Also, the deployment of enterprise services across multi-cloud and multi-domain
deployments is not automated due to lack of service chaining integration with respect to security,
privacy, and access control. Hence, we need manual provisioning (configurations), operations and
manageability of the Cloud entities. Even if they have secure mechanism for cloud entity from one
provider to communicate and pass service parameters to cloud entity of another provider, they lack
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providing policy-based access control along with privacy, when extending services across multiple
cloud service providers.
As explained above, integration and automation of multi-cloud deployment is a multidomain problem consists of IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), SaaS (Software as a Service), Cloud
entities, Service Chaining (viz., VNF, PNF), Data Centers etc., For simplicity, we have considered
Service Chaining and IaaS in a multi-cloud and multi-domain deployments in this proposed
method, same thing holds good for other multi-cloud entities. Even though the proposed method
is explained more with respect to cloud entities of a service provider, same is applicable across the
cloud service providers as well. For example: Service Chaining would comprise of services such
as EPC, Firewall, DPI etc.,
The techniques presented herein propose method to provide secure end to end network
deployment along with policy-based access control in service chaining deployments without
compromising on security, which would also help in multi cloud, comprehensive, end-to-end
network automation. The proposed method secures the end-to-end services in multi-cloud Service
Chaining deployments using service-based encryption along with policy-based access to provide
privacy using Hyperledger.
As per this method, NFV would register its services with enterprise gateway. As part of
registration, for every service registered, the enterprise gateway fetches unique Secret Key (which
is unique per service) from the Identity Provider (e.g., AAA server) and generates unique
ServiceID for mapping with the PSK as well as creating service policy. For providing policy-based
access, gateway attaches the ServiceID with the list of other services to create a service policy. For
example: EPC service can access DNS service and vice-versa, if both services are mapped to policy
P1 (EPC, DNS). After successful registration, enterprise gateway would add the transaction T with
the registered service (along with the attributes such as Type of Service, Service Name, Policy
Name and ServiceID) to the Hyperledger.
Further Secret Key is exchanged between the Service Gateway and NFV using any of the
existing PKI methods. This Secret Key is used in combination with Secret value generated on the
NFV to generate Full Secret Key pair (private key, public key), which is further used to
encrypt/decrypt the data packets exchanged between the services.
ServiceID is used to identify the service and subsequently used to fetch the PSK by the
peer NFV. Based on the service policy, one service can access the other services in the Service
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Chaining deployments. The policies attached to the services are based on a variety of attributes
(service type, resource type, security type) such as
•

Parameters associated with service and devices/instances such as type of the deployment
(thin branch or thick branch) etc.,

•

Context information such as location and routing.

•

Applications and services available with the Service Chaining such as SIG (Secure Internet
Gateway) or SWG (Secure Web Gateway) etc.

•

Security attributes associated with the services and devices/instances even of different
domains such as type of tunnelling protocol, authentication mechanism etc.,

Figure-1 describes the overall proposed method with respect to service-based encryption to secure
multi-cloud service chaining deployments.

Figure-1
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1. The NFV would register with Enterprise Gateway (enterprise router) or with any
centralised entity.
•

For registration, it can use certificate-based authentication or uses "authentication
token" or uses "OTP".

•

After successful registration,
o Gateway fetches Secret Key for the registered service from the Identity
Provider.
o Gateway shares this Secret Key with the NFV using any of the existing PKI
(asymmetric key encryption) methods.
o Gateway also generates ServiceID and share it with the NFV along with
mapped service policy. Service policy would include attributes saying,
"what are all the services and domains this NFV can access and use it".

•

Also, gateway update Type of Service, Service Name, Policy Name and ServiceID
of the registered NFV with the distributed Hyperledger (let us call it as "Cloud
Service Tracking DB" (as shown in above diagram).

2. Similarly other NFVs in the Cloud Service Chain register with the Gateway and get their
respective Service based Secret Key, Service Policy along with ServiceID.
3. Based on the Service Policy (i.e., access control), NFV's can fetch the Service Name
corresponding to the ServiceID of all the services and domains it is allowed for (in the
access policy), from the Hyperledger.
4. Secret Key generation (per service):
•

A full secret key for the service includes two parts. The first part is a Partial Secret
key PS_SID generated by the Identity Provider (from the Master Secret Key of the
Identify Provider) and identity SID of the service. The second part is a Service
Secret value SS_SID chosen by the instance/node providing the service.

5. Let us take an example, where NFV-1 and NFV-2 are participating in a service identified
by SID and message M is encrypted by NFV-1 and decrypted by NFV-2.
•

Partial Key generation per Service (PS_SID): As part of registration, NFV-1 gets
the partial secret key PS_SID generated at the Identity Provider.

•

Partial Key generation on NFV-1 (second part of the full secret key): NFV-1
generates partial secret key (also called service secret value) SS_SID.
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•

Full Secret Key generation for the service on NFV-1: Partial secret key PS_SID
(generated by the Identity Provider) and the partial secret key SS_SID generated by
the NFV-1 are used to generate Full Secret Key SK_SID_NFV-1. Along with Full
Secret Key, it also generates Public Key PK_SID_NFV-1.

•

Similarly, NFV-2 also generate Full Secret Key SK_SID_NFV-2 and Public Key
PK_SID_NFV-2.

•

Encryption @ NFV-1:
▪

•

NFV-1 encrypt the message M using Public Key PK_SID_NFV-2

Decryption @ NFV-2:
▪

NFV-2 decrypt the message M using its Full Secret Key SK_SID_NFV-2
generated above.

6. This method generates per-service encryption key and used to provide per-service
encryption along with policy-based access in multi-cloud service chaining deployments.
7. For example: Consider Secure Communication between NFV-1 and NFV-2. Consider
some prime number and random secret integers:
1. On Both NFV-1 and NFV-2
Let us say, NFV-1 and NFV-2 agree to use a prime number P = 23 and base g = 5
2. On NFV-1
a. NFV-1 chooses a secret integer a= 6,
b. Public Key of NFV-1 = g^a mod P
c. Public Key of NFV-1 = 5^6 mod 23 = 8 = A
d. Then NFV-1 sends its Public Key A=8 to NFV-2
3. On NFV-2
a. NFV-2 chooses a secret integer b=15,
b. Public Key of NFV-2 = g^b mod P
c. Public Key of NFV-2 = g^15 mod 24 = 19 = B
d. Then NFV-2 sends its Public Key B=19 to NFV-1
4. On NFV-1
a. Computes Secret key
Secret key on NFV-1 = s = B^a mod P
Secret key on NFV-1 = s = 19^6 mod 23
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Secret key on NFV-1 = s = 2
5. On NFV-2
a. Computes Secret key
Secret key on NFV-2 = s = A^b mod P
Secret key on NFV-2 = s = 8^15 mod 23
Secret key on NFV-2 = s = 2
6. Finally, Secret keys on both NFV-1 and NFV-2 are equal.

Notes:
•

This method provides service-based encryption for the service chaining deployments using
per-service Secret Key.

•

This method uses per-service Secret Key to encrypt the traffic for that service, so that along
with security, this method provides optimised/efficient method to provide per-service
secure communication.

•

To better control over the services and to provide privacy to the service chain, this method
proposes policy-based access so that only registered services can communicate each
other. Example: For the Firewall service, IPS/IDS and DPI, can be kept under the same
policy, so that only they can securely communicate each other and other services (e.g.,
DNS, EPC) which are not registered for Firewall service cannot access these services.

The

techniques

presented

herein

provides

service-based

encryption

between

NFVs/Services in Cloud Service Chaining and multi-cloud deployments (applicable even for cloud
entities of different cloud service providers. Moreover, this method is very consistent with the
security requirements of cloud computing and cloud storage. New enterprise services e.g., L2/L3
VPN, EVPN, 5G network slicing etc., are likely to extend beyond one operator’s domain and hence
maintaining Privacy along with Security is an important aspect. Additionally, as applications and
services are becoming more distributed and hence SD-WAN deployments adopting softwarecentric and programmable networks (e.g., YANG based modelling for Layer2/3 networks and
"The Topology and Orchestration Specification for Cloud Applications, TOSCA", for cloud
applications), which require secure connectivity and policy enforcement across a wide variety of
these domains.
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